As you may remember, I was just a few hundred yards away from this explosion in the BP plant next door to Dow-Texas City. As a point of reference, both plants look right across the bay to Galveston Island.
Our firemen responded to this emergency and came back haunted by what they saw.
It makes me sick to hear the leaders of BP stress how they disagree with the findings of the industry study group that came to these conclusions. 15 Working men and women died needlessly and many in BP had been warning of this possibility, and they were ignored. 200 others seriously injured, and only to increase profits. In London, by London, for London. It is going on in other places all the time and their lawyers are telling them to deny, deny, deny!
Shut up, and change the way you do business. Read the report below...

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  Subject: Houston Chronicle Report on BP
  
  March 21, 2007, 7:37AMBP lesson on cost-cutting and safety came hard
  By LOREN STEFFYCopyright 2007 Houston Chronicle
  They died for 25 percent. That's how much BP hoped to save through budget cuts in 1999 and again in 2004 at its Texas City refinery, according to a report released Tuesday.
  More than a decade of cutbacks in maintenance and training culminated on March 23, 2005, with a tanker-size load of liquid hydrocarbons spewing forth from an aging vent stack.
  The liquid ignited in less than two minutes and the ensuing fireball turned a temporary office trailer into a deathtrap.
  Fifteen workers died, scores more were injured. BP, which bought the refinery's former owner, Amoco, in 1999, has spent some $1.5 billion cleaning up the mess. That's more than 45 times what it saved in its first round of cuts, according to the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board's report.
  "Cost-cutting in the 1990s by Amoco and then BP left the Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe," the report said, adding that BP demanded cuts even though equipment was in disrepair.
  The CSB report confirms what was long suspected but never stated. Even the independent investigation led by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III danced around the issue, finding no evidence that BP consciously impaired safety with budget cuts.
  With the CSB report, the dancing is done.
  Companies like to argue that cost-cutting doesn't compromise safety. Mergers, like BP's acquisition of Amoco, often require cost-cutting to make them economically viable.
  Out-saving its rivals
  The CSB report reveals the hidden cost of such savings. It shows how cost-cutting can trump safety, and how it can erode the diligence that keeps people alive in dangerous places like refineries.
  In its drive to save money, BP skimped on hardware at the refinery, relying more on front-line employees, even as it reduced their number, their training and their oversight, the report found.
  BP's strategy was to cut costs more rapidly than its competitors, essentially boosting profits by out-saving rivals. It reduced staff, outsourced jobs and even trimmed budgets for programs like fire drills, the report found.
  Between 1998 and 2004, Amoco and then BP halved the budget for its training department and slashed the number of employees to eight from 20, the report said. It replaced the trainers with computer courses.
  In a tour of the refinery in January, former plant manager Colin Maclean told me BP is no longer using computer courses.
  In 2002, an internal study identified a critical need to increase maintenance spending at the refinery. That same year, BP executives in London demanded curbs on expenses, and the vice president of refining said the division's finances were in "crisis mode," according to the report.
  So BP managers said safety was important even as they curtailed new training classes. At the same time, they decided to delay replacing the antiquated blow-down drums, one of which was at the center of the 2005 explosion.
  What's worse, BP itself was aware that it was cutting corners.
  "BP audits, reviews and correspondence show that budget cutting and inadequate spending had impacted process safety at the Texas City refinery," the report said.
  BP, though, never bothered to review the safety impact of its cost cuts, which the report notes is essential at an aging facility like Texas City that had a history of budget cuts that had led to "mechanical integrity problems."
  'Strong disagreement'
  BP issued a statement noting that it accepted responsibility for the accident, that it apologized to the victims and their families and that it took steps to address deficiencies that spawned the disaster.
  BP said it would consider the recommendations of the CSB, even though it has "strong disagreement with some of the content of the CSB report, particularly many of the findings and conclusions."
  The CSB's report, though, targets not just the shortcomings at BP, but the larger attitudes that pervade the industry. Speaking in San Antonio on Monday, CSB Chairwoman Carolyn Merritt said she wanted other refiners to learn from BP's tragedy.
  But will they? Or will the industry continue to hide behind the familiar bromides: refineries are dangerous, accidents happen, workers are aware of the perils.
  The dead and injured in Texas City deserve better. Their suffering should be worth something more than 25 percent to the bottom line.